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Abstract 
Environmental crises, including global warming, bring about political, economic, social problems. All social subjects, voluntarily 
or forcedly, are involved in these problems. To stop the political debate and to act immediately have now become the consensus 
around the world. The Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions Trading system can have an influence on decisions taken by the 
stakeholders, while the interaction of stakeholders may impact the effectiveness of the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading 
system. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships between the stakeholders and the mechanism of interaction
based on the experience and the policy design of both EU Emission Trading Scheme and the Emissions Trading Scheme in the 
USA. Through the analysis of the stakeholders, we can set the democratic consultation mechanism, in order to build a win-win, 
justified and responsible Greenhouse Gas emissions trading system and to reduce the conflict between the stakeholders. 
© 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System (GHG ETS) is one of the policy approaches to efficiently abate GHG 
emissions by providing economic incentives. And it is expected to play an important role as a climate changing 
policy. This method has attracted attention since it was stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol. As a result, it is now 
operated or will be operated in some countries and regions, such as EU, UK, Japan and other countries or regions. 
As a public policy, the GHG ETS is the outcome of democratic consultation between the stakeholders. The 
stakeholders must take some actions to influence the decision in order to maximize their benefits. However, the 
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question is how to build a win-win, justified and responsible GHG ETS and to reduce the conflict between the 
stakeholders.  
According to the European and US experience, emission trading seems particularly fit for the climate change 
problem, especially for the greenhouse gas that lacks local effects as in the case of carbon dioxide. In this paper, 
from the perspective of stakeholders, we will use the tools of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis in order to 
investigate the design option of the GHG emission trading policy. Firstly, according to the model of greenhouse gas 
emissions trading in EU and USA, we will use the Stakeholder Theory to define the stakeholders in the system, such 
as government departments, participating enterprises, new entrants, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
citizens. Through analyzing the interest requirements of these stakeholders, this paper will examine the different 
statuses of these stakeholders in the GHG emission trading system. Secondly, we apply Stakeholder-analysis-
Approach in analyzing the internal structure and the interactions of different stakeholders in the key problems of the 
design option of the GHG ETS. We believe that the structure of the stakeholders is the key to the successful design 
of GHG ETS. Thirdly, we will investigate the actions and attitudes of the stakeholders and examine the necessary 
conditions for the stakeholders’ impact on the GHG emission trading system. Then, we will introduce democracy 
and consultation mechanism as conflict coordinating mechanism between the stakeholders and other social groups. 
We will introduce the public participation method and establish the feedback mechanism of GHG ETS, in order to 
set up a more equitable, responsible, feasible and win-win GHG emission trading system. 
2. The stakeholders and their interest requirement in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System 
In short, the stakeholders in the GHG ETS are referring to the individuals and groups who have interests related 
to the GHG ETS or its actions. Their interest requirements and abilities to influence the GHG ETS will determine 
the actions and strategies of the stakeholders, and then influence the effectiveness of the GHG ETS. In this section, 
we will analyze the key stakeholders and the fringe (potential) stakeholders as well as the structure and the interest 
requirements. 
2.1. The introduction of Stakeholder analysis 
Stakeholder Theory was first developed from the business study. In the 1990s, this analysis method was applied 
to the natural resource management.  
Stakeholder analysis is a method or a process, which through the definition of the stakeholders and the main roles 
in one system, evaluate the economic interests and preferences in order to understand a system [1]. The purpose of 
this method is to find and verify the "stakeholders" and to evaluate the interests of them. The core of the stakeholder 
analysis is to define the character, statues and the mode of action of the stakeholders, and then determine whose 
interests have to take account in the policy-making [2]. 
2.2. The definition of the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Stakeholders and their interest requirements 
Since the stakeholders are the main element of the GHG ETS, the basic of our analysis are: first, different 
initiatives of the stakeholders to influence the design option of the GHG ETS; second, different knowledge of 
different stakeholders of the GHG ETS; third, the urgency degree of the interest requirements of different 
stakeholders [3]. According to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the ETS in USA, we divide the stakeholders 
into two categories: key stakeholders and fringe (potential) stakeholders. 
2.2.1. The key stakeholders of the GHG ETS-structure and their interest requirements 
Key stakeholders are the stakeholders who are directly involved in the design and implementation of the GHG 
ETS, including the government (containing central government, local government, environmental protection 
department and other related departments), GHG emission company and the public, all the entities directly taking 
the potential risk of the results of policy implementation.  
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2.2.1.1. Government  
The function and the structure 
The government is the decision maker of the GHG ETS. It is at the heart of the design and implementation of the 
policy. The main responsibilities of the government agencies are: to definite the tap of the GHG emission, to 
regulate the implementation of the GHG policy, to verify the emission amount of the companies, and to supervise 
and promote the trade between the companies.  
Because of the different implementation levels, the structures of the involved government agencies are very 
complicated. In a regional ETS, such as EU ETS, the EU central government and the member state governments are 
all involved in the policy making process; in a national ETS, the central government and local governments are the 
decision makers; and in a local ETS, the local government is the central decision maker.  
Interest Requirement 
In general, the interest requirement of the government centers the sustainable and harmonious development of 
environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and social benefits. However, as to the specific GHG emission 
reduction target, the interest requirements of the related departments of one government may not be consistent. For 
example, the conflict between the economic efficiency requirement of local government and the environmental 
effectiveness requirement of central government, which is more common in developing countries; the interest 
conflict between the local government who seeks for economic efficiency and the environmental protection 
department who seeks for environmental effectiveness; and the conflict between the energy and financial department 
and the environmental protection department. 
For example, in China, because of our administrative system, official evaluation mechanism and economic 
development status, the economic efficiency is the primary interest requirement of the local government and its 
officials. This situation not only leads to the fact that the national GHG ETS can not be fully implemented, but also 
leads to the "free ride" of some local governments. Also, the personnel and the finance of environmental protection 
department are not independent from the government, which leads to the interest consistency between the local 
government and the environmental department. [4] 
2.2.1.2. GHG Emission enterprises 
There is no doubt that the greenhouse gas emissions enterprises, especially the large-scale greenhouse gas 
emitters, is the main object to the adjustment and regulation of the GHG ETS, therefore policy has the greatest and 
most direct influence on their interest.  
Type
According to the size of the enterprises and their impact degree on the emissions trading policy design, the 
enterprises can be divided into energy-intensive enterprises and non-energy intensive industries (as to the EU’s 
emissions trading scheme); according to the scale of the greenhouse gases emissions, the enterprises can be divided 
into large enterprises and small and medium enterprises of emissions; and according to their situations of facing the 
significant competition in the market or not, they can be divided into competitive enterprises and non-competitive 
enterprises, and so on.  
Interest Requirements 
The fundamental purpose of the emission enterprises is to pursue the maximization of economic benefits. Thus 
the environmental and social benefits are not the pursuit of interests, but its legal obligations within the legal 
framework. Therefore, environmental benefits and social benefits are the cost for the enterprises rather than their 
interest. 
2.2.1.3. Public and Environmental protection NGOs 
In democratic countries, in the process of public policy designing, formulating and implementing, the public 
participation in policy-making is a legal process. With the gradual openness of the environmental information, the 
ways of public participation are correspondingly increasing.  
Type
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The public stakeholders of the GHG ETS refer to the citizens, communities and various organizations. There is 
no doubt that the public does not directly participate in the emissions trading. But the implementation of GHG 
policy would touch the lives of almost everyone.  
Interest Requirement 
Although the government represents the interests of citizens in the process of GHG ET policy design in 
democracy countries, and the interest requirements of the government and public should be the same, this is not 
always the case. On the acknowledgement of the environmental effectiveness, there are differences between the 
public and the government. And although the environmental protection NGOs has their individual interest 
requirement, at the point of environmental benefits, the NGOs are highly consistent with the public, and even more 
urgent than the public to seek for environmental effectiveness. 
2.2.2. Fringe (potential) stakeholders  
Although some entities are not directly involved in the design and formulation of GHG ETS, in the process of 
implementation, their interests may be affected. We call these enterprises as fringe (potential) stakeholders. 
2.2.2.1. New entrants 
Definition  
New entrants here refer to the entities which start to operate after the GHG ET policy comes into effect, or the 
enterprises which increase in their production capacity of present installations. For example, under article 11(3) of 
the EU ETS Directive, member states are required to maintain a new entrant reserve (namely, a reserve of 
allowances to be allocated to new members of the scheme as and when they fall under its scope) [5]. 
Interest requirement 
Obviously, the interest requirement of the "new entrants" is the same as the incumbents as to maximize their 
economic benefits. However, as "new entrants", they can not participate in the policy making process. To be specific, 
the government should help to ensure an impartial playing field for both the new entrants and the existing operators 
and to encourage innovation and introduction of best-available techniques into the industry. 
2.2.2.2. Other regions 
Definition  
Emission leakages are the results from the higher cost of compliance associated with the GHG reduction 
requirements in the regulated region than in surrounding jurisdictions, leading to carbon leakage with no net 
reduction of global CO2 emissions. As entities within regional organizations are facing higher production costs than 
the neighboring unregulated states, they may find it advantageous to shift their production to plants outside the 
regulated region, or to build a greater number of new plants outside the region. [6] We call these unregulated regions 
as other regions. Leakage, however, only occurs when the GHG regime cost is large enough to undermine other 
advantages associated with the facility’s current location. [7] 
Interest Requirement 
To the unregulated other regions, their environmental effectiveness has been damaged. On the other hand, the 
enterprises in other regions have the competitive advantage in the market. 
The stakeholders and their interest requirement in GHG ETS are listed In Table 1.  
Table 1. The stakeholders and their interest requirement in GHG ETS 
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Stakeholders Interest Requirements 
Central governments Harmonious development of 
environment, economy and 
society.
Local governments Harmonious development of 




Environmental protection and 
public interest 
Governments 
Other departments Departmental interests and 
environmental protection 







The right to know, 
participation, environmental 
protection,  and environmental 
justice
New entrants  Maximum economic benefits Fringe(potential) 
stakeholders Other regions  Environmental protection and 
economic benefits 
3. The Interaction between the stakeholders and its relationship with the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading 
System 
The natures and scales between the stakeholders are very different. Now, based on the core issues in designing 
the GHG ETS, this section analyses the interaction between the stakeholders, in order to examine the influences of 
the interaction on the policy design. The core issues of the policy design are: the setting of the cap, the scope of the 
ETS and the allocation rules of allowances.  
3.1. The interaction between the stakeholders in the setting of the cap and the scope 
No cap means no deal. There are three problems we have to face in setting the cap and defining the scope: First, 
on which level should we set the cap? Second, what is the benchmark to set the cap? Third, who has the obligation 
to reduce emissions? And the interaction between the stakeholders is demonstrated in Fig. 1(a).  
3.1.1. Government 
Emissions trading should be, first, an instrument for environmental protection, and, second, an instrument to 
reduce the costs to meet a given emission target [8]. Therefore, on the setting of cap and the defining of scope, the 
governments should seek for environmental effectiveness and regulate the emission enterprises to reduce their 
emissions. 
On setting the cap and defining the scope, the interest requirements of government, public and environmental 
protection NGO are all to seek for environmental benefits. And a more stringent cap and scope is expected to set by 
the public and NGOs. From the market setting, the government often sets a more lenient cap in order to have a 
greatly higher degree of price stability.  
The government has to set a stable market and to avoid the distortion of competition, so it has to take account the 
interest requirements of both the new entrants and the other regions.
3.1.2. Emission enterprises 
 Zhihong Yang et al. / Procedia Environmental Sciences 2 (2010) 82–91 87
The environmental responsibility is the legal obligation that the GHG emission enterprises have to assume. These 
enterprises may have rationalized that the prospective costs of future legislation could potentially be much more 
devastating than a voluntary emissions trading scheme. However, these enterprises do not just accept the cap and the 
scope, they may also influence on the decision making of the government through lobbying in order to minimize the 
cost they have to take. Sometimes, for several reasons, the lobbying may force the government to make a not very 
strict cap, or the government may not accept the proposals of the enterprises at all.  
3.1.3. Public and Environmental protection Non-governmental organizations 
Through public participation, the public and environmental protection NGOs have influence on the decision 
making process of the government. These entities provide the technical support to the government and supervise its 
decision making process. 
3.1.4. New entrants and the other regions 
The new entrants are policy takers, because they can not participate in the decision making nor influence the 
government. 
The setting of cap and the defining of scope is not just an environmental problem, but sometimes a complicated 
political issue, as in the formulation and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. So sometimes the "other regions" 
may influence the decision making by adding political pressure, as in the case of the cap setting of U.S. Acid Rain 
Program, according to William Reilly, the EPA administrator, while Bush (then President of USA) wanted to soothe 
Canada's bruised feelings. 
3.2. The interaction between the stakeholders in the design of the allocation rules of allowances 
Currently, there are two major allocation methods, one is free allocation, such as grandfathering, and the other is 
paid allocation, such as auction. The political preference for a free allocation is stimulated by the nature of the 
environmental problem at hand: climate change, as a world-wide problem, which suffers from the fact that some 
states with important economies have not yet committed themselves to legally binding emissions reduction 
commitments. [9] In the first periods of the GHG ETS, the government often chose the free method, so in this paper, 
we only analyze the free allocation method. 
The interaction between the stakeholders in the design of the allocation rules of allowances is demonstrated in 
Fig. 1(b). 
Fig. 1. (a)The interaction between the stakeholders; (b) the interaction between the stakeholders in the design of the allocation rules of allowances 
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3.2.1. Government 
During the design of the free allocation, the government takes the economic efficiency into account as well as the 
environmental effectiveness, so as to reduce the risk of competition distort and carbon leakage. As in EU, as stated 
in Article 10 of Directive 2003/87/EC, every EU Member State was required to allocate at least 95% of the 
allowances free of charge for the three-year period 2005–2007, and at least 90% of the allowances free of charge for 
the five-year period 2008–2012. [10] 
The market competition is strongly influenced by the free allocation method, therefore, the government takes into 
account the economic efficiency of the new entrants and decides to give the new entrants the reserve, from which 
allowances should be distributed with the same methodology as applied to the incumbents. And the proposed 
amendment to Directive 2003/87/EC envisages a benchmarking system with a 5% new entry reserve available to all 
new entrants that can benefit from free allocation. [11] Nevertheless, in some cases, the government treats the new 
entrants inequitably. Such as under the Dutch NAP, incumbent top performers can receive up to 10% more 
allowances. These rules allow incumbents to retain allowances for less CO2-efficient plants while shifting 
production to more efficient installations, thus unilaterally benefit incumbents and may even further set them at a 
comparative advantage if new entry is made in another EU ETS country. For this reason, new entrants are set at a 
disadvantage not only under grandfathering schemes but also under the existing National Allocation Plans. 
3.2.2. Emission enterprises and New entrants 
Different types of enterprises have different degrees of carbon leakage. Therefore, whether the enterprises can get 
the free allowances do not depend on the conditions of competition. For example, to pursue the proposal of the 
Commission, the European Commission shall adopt by June 30th 2011, Community-wide and fully harmonized 
allocation rules for free allocation to the electricity sector, the new entrants, and the sectors which are exposed to 
strong international competition and can lead to a significant risk of carbon leakage [12]. 
To create political acceptability, ‘grandfathering’ has been used as the primary method of allocating allowances. 
This means that polluters receivive most emission rights free of charge primarily based on their historical emissions. 
Furthermoreˈthe historical emission data are collected so that the enterprises may submit historical emissions data 
by voluntary and self-reported submissions on behalf of the enterprises, to make sure firms had an incentive to 
signal higher emissions in order to receive more grandfathered allowances. [13] 
On the other hand, the enterprises which are not obtaining free allowances may relocate their production to other 
regions or pass the extra costs onto consumers. For example, Oxera and Smale et al. using a Cournot oligopoly 
model, found positive impacts of the EU ETS on the profitability of most energy intensive industries in the UK. For 
these industries (which mainly operate on the European market), their increases in production costs are more than 
compensated by higher output prices and they also benefit from the free allocation of grandfathered allowances. The 
only exception is the aluminum industry, which faces global competition and does not receive any free allowances 
(because most of its CO2 is not emitted directly, but indirectly through its electricity use). This industry would be 
unable to bear the cost increases and was expected to relocate its production to outside the EU. [14] 
3.2.3. Public and Environmental Protection NGOs 
Because of free allocation, the polluters have received an asset with a market value free of charge. To the public 
and NGOs, the grandfathering may thus be perceived as unfair from a polluter-pays perspective. So the free 
allocation is often criticized by the public and NGOs. 
3.2.4. Other regions 
Free allocation method reduces the risk of emission leakage, but it’s not always available. Political issues may 
arise when the environmental benefits of other regions are influenced by the ETS.  
3.3. The impact of the interactions between the stakeholders on the GHG ETS 
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3.3.1. The core status of the government is the basic impetus of the development and implementation of the GHG 
ETS
The government is the core in the design of the GHG ETS. As the decision maker, the determination and the 
action of the government in tackling global warming will determine the development and implementation of the 
GHG ETS. However, this does not mean that the government can design the policy at random, it has to take into 
account the interest requirements of other stakeholders. 
3.3.2. The fair competition between the incumbents and new entrants is the guarantee of the effectiveness of the 
GHG ETS 
The GHG ETS is based on the market. So to ensure a ‘level playing field’ is the key problem in the design of the 
GHG ETS. Hence, the equilibrium of the different interest requirements and the equal treatment to the entities are 
the basis of the development of the allowances market.  
3.3.3. The impact of open participation from the public and the environmental protection NGOs is not very obvious 
Although the public and NGOs are involved in the design of the GHG ETS, the impact of the public participation 
on the policy is not very obvious. There are three reasons to this, including: firstly, the public participation may be 
the only way to express the interest requirements for the public, and  thanks to the presence of inherent information 
asymmetry, the public can not defend its interest powerfully; secondly, although the government is the interest 
representation of the public, obviously, the government also has its own independent interest, which may conflict 
with the interest of the public; thirdly, as the operators of firms are free to decide either to establish greenhouse gas 
reducing opportunities or to buy allowances, the public and NGOs have no legal opportunity to influence the 
decision-making of this installation. [15] 
These reasons will influence the democratic foundation of the GHG ETS. 
4. The democratic consultation mechanism for the stakeholders of the GHG ETS 
The democratic consultation mechanism is an effective tool to reduce the resistance and the interest conflict. To 
construct a democratic consultation for the stakeholders is an approach to make a harmonious and feasible GHG 
ETS.
4.1. The principles of consultation: equality and polluter-pays principle 
We must emphasize that emissions trading should be, first, an instrument for environmental protection, and 
second, an instrument to reduce the costs to meet a given emission target. During the consultation, the participants 
have to follow the equality principle and the polluter-pays principle in order to meet the environmental protection 
targets.  
No doubt, the equality between the stakeholders is the precondition of the democratic consultation. The equality 
means that the stakeholders have an equal chance to participate in the consultation and to express their interest 
requirements. The equality principle seeks to ensure that stakeholders are treated similarly within the consultation 
and it seems that the difference in treatment must not be arbitrary, but be based on rational and objective 
considerations. [16] The equality principle becomes a powerful tool in the hands of the government to seek for an 
ever higher level of harmonization. 
During the consultation, no matter what the interest requirements are, the results of the consultation must include 
the polluter-pays principle, which means the polluters have to pay for the emission, instead of getting profit from it.  
4.2. The construction of consultation 
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x The setting of the consultation rules. Before the consulting, the consultation rules should be set by the 
stakeholders, but certainly this is just one part of the consultation. During the setting of the rules, the following 
questions must be considered:  
Can every type of the stakeholders participate?  
Can every representative of the stakeholders express their interest requirements? 
x The assessment of the interactions between the stakeholders as well as their interest requirements. Through 
discussions and consultations, the contents and urgency of different interest requirements and status of the 
stakeholders are assessed in order to determine the order among the stakeholders.  
x The disclosure of the stakeholders' information. Through information disclosure, one stakeholder can understand 
others’ situation and interest requirements, and then promote their communication and coordination.  
x The protection of the vulnerable stakeholders. The interest requirements of the vulnerable stakeholders may be 
ignored by the government and other stakeholders.  
x The expansion of the public participation. The consultation information and the information of the stakeholders 
are disclosed in order to get more good advices. 
5. Conclusion 
The GHG ETS can combine members from both the private and public sector thus adds to the accountability of 
the organization. And it is also indicative of a genuine aim to work with all stakeholders while addressing the 
problem of climate change, under the umbrella of sustainable development. [17] This paper has examined the 
stakeholders as well as their interest requirements under the design of the GHG Emissions Trading System. Through 
the analysis, we conclude that the core status of the government is the basic impetus of the development and 
implementation of the GHG ETS, the fair competition between the incumbents and new entrants is the guarantee of 
the effectiveness of the GHG ETS, and the impact of the open participation of the public and environmental 
protection NGOs is not very obvious. Then based on the equality and polluter-pays principle, we have constructed a 
democratic consultation mechanism, in order to set a platform for the stakeholders to express their interest 
requirements equally and openly. 
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